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Introduction
The capital markets in Uruguay have remained underdeveloped despite the growth and internationalization of its onshore and offshore banking industry following a liberalization that took place in the 1970s. Not even the development of a lively, liquid market for government securities has been able to nurture the parallel growth of a corporate bond market, and thus virtually all companies continue to rely mostly on financing from banks and suppliers rather than from the capital markets (De Brun, Gandelman and Barbieri, 2003) . Certain laws passed in the mid-1990s specifically intended to promote the development of the local capital markets did boost the issuance of corporate debt, particularly on the part of banks. However, after some corporate defaults and near-default episodes took place in the late 1990s, the confidence of investors was shattered and the fledgling corporate bond market shriveled up -a vivid application of the literature on agency costs and on the opportunistic behavior of shareholders over bondholders.
In 2002, Uruguay suffered a profound financial crisis triggered by contagion effects from the run on banks, massive currency devaluation, and gigantic default on sovereign debt that took place in next-door Argentina. In the wake of a run on its own exceedingly dollarized banking system, Uruguay's government was forced by the ensuing loss of international reserves to let the currency depreciate rapidly; come to the financial support of some financial institutions and intervene several failing private-sector banks, for which purpose massive financial backing from the Washington-based multilateral agencies was obtained; and eventually arrange for a market-friendly restructuring of the public debt. The fall-out of this crisis on the local capital markets was such that the volume traded in the traditional stock exchange fell by 14% in 2002 measured in US dollars (USD), while volumes in the electronic exchange dropped by more than half. Starting in the fourth quarter of 2003, however, the Uruguayan economy has staged a vigorous recovery and the government has regained access to the domestic and international capital markets; in contrast, the local equity and fixed-income markets have not revived. There is lingering damage in terms of investor confidence in firms, regulators, auditors and credit-rating companies -but these may not be the only impediments to the further deepening of the domestic fixed-income market.
The objectives of this paper are: (a) to recall the stunted development of the debt market in Uruguay, including for both government and corporate instruments; (b) to analyze whether and how the limited availability of long-term funding via the fixed-income market is related to firm characteristics, like their size (d) to determine what institutional and regulatory aspects are hampering the development of the domestic capital markets. For this purpose, we have constructed a financial database on Uruguayan firms and we have generated new data from a comprehensive survey of potential corporate issuers, institutional investors, and financial intermediaries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the Uruguayan capital markets. The analysis of the supply side is conducted in Section 3, including an analysis of the financial structure of Uruguayan firms, the perceived obstacles for each financing alternative, and an analysis of the cost of issuing bonds. Section 4 focuses on the demand side, with a description of the main local institutional investors and the problems they believe exist. Section 5 is the conclusion.
The development of the Uruguayan capital market

Background
Between the 1930s and 1950s, Uruguay's economy grew strongly based on an import-substitution strategy made viable by booming international demand for its agricultural products during World War II and the Korean War. However, the rise of agricultural protectionism in Europe and the U.S., the small size of the domestic market, increased recourse to inflationary finance of the government budget, and the distortions generated by various forms of state interference, ended up depleting the possibilities of investment growth via this development strategy. The Uruguayan economy thus experienced high inflation, massive currency depreciation, and economic stagnation between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, with grave social and political consequences.
The surge of domestic inflation in the 1950s eroded the value of the public debt issued up to the 1930s to finance the development of most of the public infrastructure both at national and local government levels. The inflationary environment and the weakness of the tax structure (mostly based on export taxes and import tariffs applied to a shrinking base of foreign trade) closed the government's access to financial markets starting in the late 1950s. The distortions introduced by inflation in the information provided by corporate financial statements also reduced their reliability and the attractiveness of private-sector securities, and turnover in the local stock exchange decreased steadily until the mid-1970s.
From the 1970s to the Brady Plan
After stabilization policies and structural reforms were implemented starting in 1973, inflation decelerated and economic growth resumed, accompanied by an increase in foreign trade and private investment. The reforms included a tax structure modernization, trade liberalization, and full convertibility of the capital account of the balance of payments. Specifically, a value-added tax was introduced, non-tariff barriers to trade were mostly eliminated, import tariffs were gradually reduced, interest rate caps became non-binding, exchange-rate controls were eliminated, and the access of financial intermediaries to the capital markets was liberalized.
A subsequent improvement in the fiscal situation allowed the government to return to the financial markets, and it did that by issuing securities via the local 5 stock exchange. Given the full convertibility of the Uruguayan peso, the government was able to issue long-term debt denominated in USD, which was accepted by domestic and regional investors eager to protect themselves from the ravages of inflation. It was through domestic issues of short-and mediumterm (up to 8-year) government debt that the local capital market was given a new lease on life after the mid-1970s.
Indeed, the government's financing needs and liability-management operations have set the tone for most activity in the Uruguayan capital markets ever since the financial reforms of the 1970s. Although it is counterintuitive at first sight, the debt crisis of the 1980s spurred the issuance of public debt in the domestic capital market as a substitute for the financing that was no longer forthcoming from foreign banks, the main source of new funds for the public sector during the second half of the 1970s. And because of the government's relatively good behavior during the regional debt crisis -specifically, interest payments were always made on time, and no unilateral default was ever declared -the government managed to finance fiscal deficits equivalent to more than 4% of GDP during the 1980s, paying less than 200 bps over LIBOR in the domestic market while restructuring principal payments on its external debt with private banks under both the Baker Initiative and the Brady Plan
As can be seen in Table A1 in the Appendix, there was a high and increasing participation of short-term debt (Treasury bills) in the market for government debt during the second half of the 1980s. Starting in 1991, however, and following the successful debt restructuring under the Brady Plan, the government pursued a strategy of extending maturities. This is reflected in the decreasing participation of short-term debt during the 1990s all the way until 2001, when adverse developments in Argentina and then in Brazil scared investors -and bank depositors -away.
The loans from international banks that were restructured successively since the early 1980s until the Brady arrangement in February 1991, constituted the only market obligations subject to foreign jurisdiction. The contractual features of those loans were such that they were registered as obligations of the Central Bank (Banco Central del Uruguay, BCU), as presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. The bonds issued under the Brady arrangement (Par, New Money and Debt Conversion bonds) likewise were the only ones issued under foreign jurisdictions until 1994, when the government began to place new debt in the international market mainly in the form of Eurobonds. Indeed, by the end of the 1990s, half of the central government debt outstanding was issued subject to foreign jurisdictions -a share would continue to rise in the years that followed.
During the mid-1970s, when the domestic market for public debt began to be developed, the BCU acted as the government's financial agent, issuing securities through the Montevideo Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de   1   I  n  a  d  d  i  t  i  o  n  t  o  t  h  e  c  o  n  f  i  d  e  n  c  e  t  h  a  t  U  r  u  g  u  a  y  '  s  s  o  v  e  r  e  i  g  n  b  o  n  d  s  m  a  y  h  a  v  e  i  n  s  p  i  r  e  d  a  m  o  n  g  d  o  m  e  s  t  i  c  i  n  v  e  s  t  o  r  s  ,  t  h  e  r  e  i  s  n  o  d  o  u  b  t  t  h  a  t  c  a  p  i  t  a  l  o  u  t  f  l  o  w  s  f  r  o  m  A  r  g  e  n  t  i  n  a  d  u  r  i  n  g  t  h  e  1  9  8  0  s  a  l  s  o  b  e  c  a  m  e  a  s  t  r  o  n  g  s  o  u  r  c  e  o  f  d  e  m  a  n  d  f  o  r  U  r  u  g  u  a  y  a  n  p  u  b  l  i  c  d  e  b t .
Montevideo, BVM), giving stockbrokers a premium on the face value of the securities. The bonds where usually issued at par, and they were distributed proportionally among the participants. This practice was maintained until the early 1990s, when the BCU began to issue public debt through auctions in an over-the-counter (OTC) market. Since then, the public sector's presence in the primary debt market has been infrequent.
Public debt instruments have been by far the most actively traded in the secondary market, in both the BVM and the Electronic Stock Exchange (Bolsa Electrónica de Valores, BEVSA). As can be seen in Table 2 .1, the years 1999 and 2000 where exceptional in terms of the participation of private-sector instruments in the secondary markets, because of the combined effects of no significant debt issuance abroad on the part of the government and increased domestic market appetite for securities -mainly certificates of deposit (CDs) issued by banks. But even in those special years, private-sector issuance barely reached levels of around one quarter of total turnover. Most of the time, government securities have represented more than 90% of total transactions in the secondary market. 
Government access to international markets
After the Uruguayan government gained access to the international financial markets, the bonds issued under foreign jurisdiction (mostly New York law) have been the main driver of transactions in the Uruguayan bourses. This was especially true after 1998, when Uruguay obtained an investment-grade rating for its sovereign debt from all the leading credit-rating agencies. The participation of domestic end-investors -particularly pension funds following a reform of the social security system -in the secondary market for public debt issued overseas gave great impulse to turnover in years like 1998 and 2001. At the same time, transactions involving securities issued domestically dropped significantly after 1998.
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The attractiveness of government securities issued abroad for participants in the secondary market has been their relatively higher liquidity, at least in comparison with securities issued domestically, which usually have lower amounts outstanding. This effect was markedly reinforced after the debt restructuring exercise of 2003, when many of the existing bonds submitted were exchanged under the "liquidity option" for three "benchmark" bonds each of which qualified (because of its size) to be included in the JP Morgan EmergingMarket Bond Index. A visible characteristic of Uruguay's public debt is its extremely high degree of dollarization -now as well as before the 2003 debt restructuring. This longstanding willingness of the public sector to run a massive currency mismatch has had repercussions throughout the Uruguayan financial system, and remains one of its main sources of fragility (Licandro and Licandro, 2003; De Brun and Licandro, 2005) . A critical step towards a greater presence of the domestic currency in the financial system and the capital markets is the development of a yield curve for sovereign instruments in domestic currency, to be used as a benchmark for the introduction of private-sector securities likewise denominated in local currency, with the potential development of a market for derivative products.
Indeed, during the past couple of years, the government has been trying to pave the way for a financial market in peso-denominated instruments, featuring nominal, fixed-rate securities as well as inflation-adjusted debt. The issuance of debt instruments in pesos was kick-started when the BCU began to deal in short-term Treasury bills in pesos for monetary policy purposes -and it grew rapidly during 2003-04, although the trend slowed down somewhat in 2005. U  r  u  g  u  a  y  a  n  d  e  b  t  e  x  c  h  a  n  g  e  o  f  2  0  0  3  g  a  v  e  b  o  n  d  h  o  l  d  e  r  s  t  w  o  o  p  t  i  o  n  s  :  a  )  u  n  d  e  r  t  h  e  "  e  x  t  e  n  s  i  o  n  o  p  t  i  o  n  ,  "  a  n  e  x  i  s  t  i  n  g  b  o  n  d  c  o  u  l  d  b  e  e  x  c  h  a  n  g  e  d  f  o  r  a  n  e  w  o  n  e  w  i  t  h  s  a  m  e  p  r  i  n  c  i  p  a  l  ,  c  u  r  r  e  n  c  y  a  n  d  c  o  u  p  o  n  ,  b  u  t  w  i  t  h  a  n  e  x  t  e  n  d  e  d  m  a  t  u  r  i  t  y  (  f  i  v  e  y  e  a  r  s  ,  o  n  a  v  e  r  a  g  e  )  ;  b  )  u  n  d  e  r  t  h  e  "  l  iu  i  d  i  t  y  o  p  t  i  o  n  ,  "  e  x  i  s  t  i  n  g  b  o  n  d  s  c  o  u  l  d  b  e  e  x  c  h  a  n  g  e  d  f  o  r  s  o  -c  a  l  l  e  d  b  e  n  c  h  m  a  r  k  b  o  n  d  s  ,  u  n  d  e  r  w  h  i  c  h  m  a  n  y  s  m  a  l  l  b  o  n  d  s  c  o  u  l  d  b  e  a  g  g  r  e  g  a  t  e  d  .  T  h  e  r  e  w  e  r  e  "  b  e  n  c  h  m  a  r  k  "  b  o  n  d  s  b  o  t  h  i  n  t  h  e  i  n  t  e  r  n  a  t  i  o  n  a  l  a  n  d  t  h  e  l  o  c  a  l  d  e  b  t  e  x  c  h  a  n  g  e  t  r  a  n  s  a  c  t  i  o  n  s  ,  b  u  t  t  h  e  s  i  z  e  o  f  t  h  e  d  o  m  e  s  t  i  c  b  e  n  c  h  m  a  r  k  s  w  a  s  m  u  c  h  l  o  w  e  r  t  h  a  n  t  h  e  i  n  t  e  r  n  a  t  i  o  n  a  l  o  n  e s .
Meantime, the introduction of inflation-adjusted instruments denominated in pesos got a boost from the international issue of a first inflation-linked bond in October 2003, for an amount equivalent to US$200 million.
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This was the first placement in the markets after the debt restructuring, and the first international issue of a Latin American sovereign bond denominated in local currency -a transaction that was emulated by Colombia and Brazil in 2004 and 2005, respectively . The real rate of 10.5% for a three-year maturity could be considered high, but was lower than the cost of placements made at that time in the domestic market (usually above 11%).The catalytic effect of that international placement is reflected in the increased interest of domestic investors --and presumably foreign investors acting through domestic intermediaries -in local placements of UI bonds (where UI stands for unidad indexada, namely, debt indexed to the consumer price index). By the end of 2004, the real interest rate on UI bonds with 10-year maturities had fallen to below 5%, and showed a further drop during 2005.
The successful placement of peso-denominated instruments in the local OTC and in international markets generated increased participation of these securities in the local secondary market for public debt. Transactions involving government debt securities in pesos increased to 12% of total in 2003 (from almost zero before that) and to 26% in 2004, with a lower participation rate (above 20%) in the first nine months of 2005 (see Table 2 .2). The lesser impulse in the development of the secondary market for peso-denominated instruments in 2005 reflects the new government's strategy to prioritize a lengthening in the maturity of its debt, via long-term, USD-denominated debt in local and foreign markets. Nevertheless, the larger amount outstanding of inflation-linked notes issued by the BCU and the government has helped to increase turnover in the secondary market, from a mere 1.5% of public debt transactions in 2003 The existence of a relatively active secondary market for public debt instruments usually generates a mix of positive and negative externalities: While they set a benchmark for private-sector debt issues which may prove useful for pricing and distribution purposes, they can also engender damaging crowdingout effects. Before undertaking our survey of potential corporate debt issuers, we hypothesized that the lively market for government debt in Uruguay would
have important implications for them, including in terms of issue size, pricing, maturity, and currency denomination. As it turns out, the potential issuers we surveyed seem to disagree. With respect to their eventual issuance of bonds, only 15% of them believe that the mere existence of a liquid market for sovereign debt will facilitate their own issuance. In fact, the government is perceived as a competitor in the search for funding by 22% of survey respondents. In sum, most of the surveyed firms are neutral with respect to the impact of government debt issuance in the market for private capital, but if anything it is perceived more negatively than positively.
Incipient development of the corporate sector
During the 1990s, new legislation was enacted in an attempt to spur the development of a domestic capital market, particularly on the back of a deepening primary and secondary market for government securities. Many of the new rules were devoted to dealing with lingering issues of corporate transparency.
The most important piece of legislation was the Securities Market Law (Law 16.746 of May 30, 1996) . Notwithstanding the initiative of the government to promote the approval of the Law, it also had the strong support o interested parties, especially stockbrokers operating via the Montevideo Stock Exchange. From the side of the government, there was an explicit goal of facilitating economic development through the deepening of financial access for Uruguayan firms. The financial intermediaries, on their part, perceived business opportunities with the development of the market for private sector securities, especially considering that renewed access by the government to international financial markets would gradually decrease the importance of the local exchanges in transactions involving public debt. Even for local banks, which may have seen challenges arising from the competition of capital markets in providing funds for the corporate sector, the development of alternative sources of financing was perceived as a useful means to diversify financing risks. In fact, local banks have since acted as intermediaries in the public placement of corporate debt, with the main purpose of reducing their exposure to particular corporate debtors.
Support from financial intermediaries for the new legislation was also forthcoming because the general framework adopted was too liberal with respect to the regulation and supervision by government agencies of intermediaries and stock exchanges. Notwithstanding the powers entitled to the BCU to regulate and supervise the activities of the exchanges, issuers and intermediaries, the over-the-counter transactions were explicitly excluded from the Securities Market Law provisions, and the principle of self-regulation of bourses was enacted. In sum, Uruguay lacks a developed market for corporate obligations, and as detailed below, financing for companies still comes mainly from retained earnings, bank loans and suppliers' credit. In many recent business failures in Uruguay, a majority of equity holders had delegated management to minorities. In other instances, minority shareholders became hostage to majority owners who abused their rights, squeezing out said minority players and forcing them to take heavy losses. A high-profile business failure -it later proved to be an organized scam -that took place in the late 1990s elicited new regulation to enforce greater transparency. However, more recent failures suggest that the problem is not solely one of lack of transparency, but that agency problems may also be playing a significant role. These agency problems related to transparency and accountability issues have recently been the focus on extensive debate around the globe, following financial scandals even in the United States and Europe. Considering that Uruguay has an underdeveloped capital market, one could argue by analogy with the Klapper and Love (2002) findings that the role of corporate governance is even more relevant than usual.
The peculiarities of separation (or lack thereof) between management, ownership and control may be relevant as well. It is typical in Uruguay that boards of directors are very much linked to the main shareholders, and independent persons serving on boards are very rare. In actual practice, it is managers, who are related to companies by virtue of labor contracts, who concentrate most decision rights -both managerial and control rights -rather than boards of directors. Yet another concern arises from the presence of integrated economic groups and of financial links among related companies.
The existing legislation on corporate structures (Law 16.060) includes some elements of protection for minority shareholders, but they are not sufficient given the practices and problems that have been encountered. Two government agencies have tried to fill the void: Recent regulations issued by the BCU have specified duties, responsibilities and penalties in relation to external auditors, and the Office of the Auditor General (Auditoría Interna de la Nación, AIN) has been introducing new rules to improve accounting standards and mandating the adoption of international best practices. But the most important improvement to Law 16.060 will be the new Law on Bankruptcy procedures, which is about to be debated in Congress. Its objective is to regulate the procedures governing corporate debt restructurings and bankruptcies under a unified framework, inspired by the U.S. Chapter 11. Besides the acceleration of these procedures, including facilitating the transfer of ownership before a business loses its worth, which may help to increase recovery values, the proposed law also clarifies the responsibilities and sanctions to acting majorities and managers in the failure of a firm.
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The country also has in place detailed regulations on the operations of creditrating agencies, an activity that has come under scrutiny in recent years because of a series of failures in the assessment of corporate creditworthiness as evident in episodes of default in the context of the crisis of 2002. In our view, Uruguay's experience with rating agencies is not all that dissimilar to that observed in other countries hit by systemic financial crises. As pointed out below when summarizing the results of our survey of institutional investors, it appears that the local market has come to accept the outcome even though those default episodes did cause the rating agencies to lose some of their reputation.
A technical issue that introduces a high degree of risk in the operation of the capital markets in Uruguay, notwithstanding the difficulty of ascertain its precise impact, is the absence of a single depository agent and the less-than-adequate clearing and settlement process (Clarke, 2004) . The BCU is the depository agent of securities included in the portfolios of the pension funds, as it is in general when it comes to government securities issued in the domestic market on a book-entry basis. However, there is no regulation in place concerning the custody of physical bonds or securities issued by other financial and nonfinancial corporations. Moreover, the compensation process takes place in the first instance in the corresponding exchanges, and after that net balances are settled on a bilateral manner through the accounts that agents maintain at the BCU. Since no guarantees are demanded on credit lines of the different market operators, there is always a risk that the transaction will not be completed, as in fact happened in 2002 after four financial institutions were suspended. This is an issue which may be resolved in the near future, given the recent announcement made by the BCU that it has drafted a new law that clarifies the process of payment-order confirmation and the introduction of collateral to back transactions.
Supply analysis: The corporate sector
Here we describe the financial structure of Uruguayan firms and report on the main problems faced to finance their activities. We made use of two sources of data. First, we enlisted the collaboration of the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE), which agreed to conduct a special survey targeted at potential issuers of securities. The survey took place during August-September 2005. We refer to this as the INE database. Second, using data from the Office of the Auditor General (AIN), we construct a financial database covering 2001-03 that may shed light in the change in the financial structure before and after the 2002 crisis, and may also differentiate between publicly traded and non-publicly traded firms. We refer to this as the AIN database.
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Databases
2.a. The AIN financial database
Past research on the financial structure of companies operating in Uruguay has been hampered by the paucity of published balance sheets and income statements. This has been, in large measure, a consequence of the underdevelopment of the country's equity and fixed-income markets, which meant that most firms did not have to disclose such information.
In recent years, a great deal of corporate data has become available through AIN, which has now made accessible a statistical base covering all sectors of the economy. One recent research effort by Munyo (2005) focused on a carefully defined sample of 500 enterprises (excluding financial and duty-freezone companies) during 2001, before the country's latest economic crisis. In order to be able to compare the financial structure of firms before and after the exchange rate crisis of 2002, we combined data from Munyo (2005) and Gili (2005) and gathered new financial statements in order to have the financial information of 98 firms before and after the exchange rate crisis.
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Therefore, we have a picture of the financial structure of publicly and non-publicly traded firms under a crawling currency peg regime (up to mid-2002) and under a sharply depreciated, floating currency regime (afterwards). Table 3 .1 presents the number of observations by sector of activity (ISIC Revision 2) and according to degree of access to the capital markets. 
2.b. The INE survey
INE conducts an annual survey of economic activity that encompasses most sectors of the economy. Since the capital markets are not a real option for small firms, we did not attempt to target INE's whole sample: Our sample therefore includes all firms regularly surveyed by INE that have more than 50 employees. The rate of response was to 100%,
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and we therefore ended up with 463 firms adequately covering the following sectors (according to ISIC Rev. 3): DManufacturing, G-Commerce, H-Hotels and restaurants, I-Transportation services, K-Real estate and machine rentals, M-Educational services, and NHealth services. Table 3 .2 disaggregates surveyed firms by branch of activity and by district of location (so-called departments). Given Uruguay's economic structure, the most important omission from the sample is that of individuals and firms engaged in activities such farming and cattle. The rest of the economy would appear to be adequately represented. Table 3 .3 presents the breakdown by location (department). As expected, especially due to the omission of firms engaged in agriculture, most of the firms are located in the capital city of Montevideo. 
The vast majority of firms surveyed are 100% owned by Uruguayans, with only 14% of them being majority-owned by foreigners. In the late 1980s, changes were instituted in the regulation of business companies and a single regulatory body of rules applicable to different types of organizational forms was put in place. An explicit objective of this reform was to provide investors with a range of structures, each with its own particularities as to ownership and control, in order that they might accommodate different needs and thus facilitate investment in general.
In Uruguay, business ventures are usually organized as corporations (sociedad anónima), limited-liability companies (sociedad de responsabilidad limitada), or partnerships (sociedad colectiva). In recent years, except when tax reasons favor the use of any of the latter structures, most companies are organizing themselves as corporations. Furthermore, the regulatory changes of the 1980s seem to have had the expected effect of increasing the number of corporations, since in the mid-1970s the ratio of corporations to limited-liability companies was 1 to 5, while in the mid-1980s the number was evenly balanced -and by the mid-1990s there were some 4,400 corporations vs. about 3,000 limitedliability companies (Olivera and Bugallo, 1996) .
Despite this trend, most of the firms remain closed corporations. Only 2% of our sample (9 firms) is listed in the local bourse and only 0.4% is listed internationally (2 firms). This result reflects the low development of the capital markets in Uruguay. On the other hand, the evaluation of the problems encountered by these firms when attempting to raise funds through the capital markets should be treated with some caution. 
Financial structure of Uruguayan firms
Pioneering analytical work by Pascale (1978 Pascale ( , 1982 Pascale ( , 1994 , and subsequently by Robledo (1994) , was based on surveys conducted periodically by the BCU among dozens of companies engaged in manufacturing. However, the sample and nature of the information gathered by these surveys during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s changed over time, such that their results do not provide a homogenous picture. Nevertheless, the available data show that manufacturing firms in Uruguay tended to be highly indebted, even by standards common in developing countries. Ratios of corporate debt to assets averaged around 60% in the early 1970s and about 70% during the 1980s and early 1990s.
In terms of the maturity structure of these corporate obligations, the proportion of long-term debt tended to be low but rising over time, from less than 15% of 1 7 total prior to 1980 to nearly 40% of total by the early 1990s. This ability to obtain longer-term funds may have been related to the sharply increased dollarization of liabilities over time: corporate debts in foreign currencies represented less than 20% of total liabilities up until the mid-1970s, but they accounted for more than 60% of total by the early 1980s, averaging two thirds of total during 1989-91. As a result of this liability dollarization, most companies began to run large currency mismatches, since their sales were largely booked in local currency and their foreign-currency-denominated assets were small (e.g., 10% of total assets during 1982-84). This exposed them to financial losses every time that the exchange rate suffered a major depreciation -at least once a decade.
Banks have been by far the principal source of financing for manufacturing companies in Uruguay, with obligations to them representing more than half, and sometimes more than two thirds, of total corporate liabilities. Access to a local bond market has never been a realistic option for most firms, except for the few years during the mid-1990s when new debt instruments (the aforementioned Obligaciones Negociables, ONs) became popular in the wake of new legislation raising the amount that firms could issue (relative to their capital). However, nearly 70% of the securities traded belonged to those issued by private-sector banks, and as mentioned the market dried up in the late 1990s following the filing for bankruptcy of one of the corporate issuers -the poultry firm Moro in 1998 (Bentancor 1999) .
A longitudinal study by Monteserín and Chiappori (2004) focused on companies that had issued securities and therefore had been obligated to publish their financial balance sheets and income statements. This is an admittedly nonrepresentative sample of firms. The authors developed two samples. The first featured 26 companies that had issued stocks and provided accounts during 17 years in a row (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) . They exhibited fairly stable ratios of debt to assets averaging 46% -much lower than the leverage ratios seen in prior studies. The second set included 38 firms that had issued bonds (ONs), some of which had previously issued stocks and thus were part of the first sample, for which financial accounts were available for eight consecutive years (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) . This latter sample exhibited leverage ratios of close to 60%, which tended to increase over time (from an initial level of close to 50% to almost 70%) in reflection of their issuance of corporate bonds. Munyo (2005) found that 60% of corporate financing needs were met through borrowing (40% therefore from retained earnings), none of which included the issuance of equity or debt securities. Reliance on bank credit was on average as great as on trade credit, though larger companies with greater tangible assets tended to rely proportionally more on bank rather than trade financing, and had greater access to long-term financing. Coincidentally with Munyo's results, the two main sources of external funds for the surveyed firms were bank loans and suppliers' credit. The principal component of the "other liabilities" column is internally generated funds, with securities accounting for a tiny proportion of total liabilities.
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We present the computation of three oft-reported financial indicators. The solvency ratio is defined as the ratio of equity over the sum of equity and total liabilities. A second indicator is the ROA (return on assets), defined as the ratio between the net operating income before interest payments and total assets. The median ROA is 50% lower than the mean ROA, implying that the distribution of this statistic is heavily skewed to the left. Given the implicit risk present in investment projects taking place in Uruguay, an ROA median of 6.5% seems to be somewhat low. As a rule of thumb, we could take this figure as the maximum interest rate that Uruguayan firms could afford to pay. The leverage indicator is defined as the ratio between total liabilities and total equity. Table 3 .8 reports financial summary statistics for the database constructed using the information from the AIN. Here we disaggregate between publicly and non-publicly traded firms. De Brun, Gandelman and Barbieri (2003) reports that between 1997 and 2000 the asset turnover ratio slowed down, causing deterioration in the profitability ratios. The same seems to have happened in the 2001-03 period, most likely due to the 2002 crisis.
Publicly traded firms are substantially larger than non-publicly traded firms. This can be seen both in the total assets and equity columns. There is an endogeneity problem in the access to capital markets that calls for caution when interpreting the effect of access to capital markets on other variables. For instance, larger firms may be more likely to have access to longer-term bank credit and also may be prone to have access to financing through the capital markets. If this is the case, the share of long-term credit may not be a feature of the capital market but, rather, may be a consequence of firm size.
Among the non-publicly traded firms in our database there are none with the size of the average publicly traded firms. Naturally, the candidates to issue bonds are the largest firms in the country -the state owned public utility firms. 
2.a. Term and currency mismatches
Using data for 2004 from the INE survey, we can confirm that Uruguayan firms suffer from severe currency and maturity mismatches. The average firm in the INE survey has 36% of its liabilities in USD. Considering only financial liabilities, the average participation of USD-denominated liabilities was 52%, and the median even larger at 76%. In terms of maturity, 84.4% of the liabilities of the average firm were of a short-term nature. The maturity of suppliers' credit was lower than that of bank credit, but on average 77% of financial credit was nevertheless of a short-term nature. These results confirm that Uruguayan firms have great difficulty in accessing long-term credit, in particular, even via the issuance of USD-denominated corporate bonds. Disaggregating the availability of long-term financing for national and foreign-owned firms, it is surprising that foreign firms have an even lower share of long-term liabilities (11% against 17% for national firms). Smaller firms tend to have less access to long-term credits. The correlation of long term liabilities with various measures of firm size (e.g., assets, equity, and employees) is positive and significant.
The INE survey included one specific question targeted to know if firms take any precaution regarding their currency and term mismatches. Only 7% of firms used derivatives to change the profile of their liabilities, and thus their mismatches were mostly unhedged.
The AIN financial database allows for a detailed analysis of term and currency mismatches (Tables 3.9 and 3.10). After the 2002 crisis, while the share of short-term liabilities remained basically unchanged, there was a reduction in the share of short-term assets. The legally forced restructuring of deposits (up to three years) in state-owned and rescued private-sector banks is likely the cause 2 0 of this reduction. Maturity mismatches seems also to be larger among nonpublicly traded firms.
The percentage of assets in foreign currency in 2003 is slightly lower than in 2001 for both publicly and non-publicly traded firms. On the contrary, the share of USD liabilities increased after the currency and banking crisis. The decrease in asset dollarization may in part be produced by the de-dollarization agenda pushed since then by the government, and the increased share of USD liabilities is likely a direct effect of currency devaluation. Both effects are probably responsible for the fact that while in 2001 USD assets were 57% of USD liabilities, by 2003 they were equivalent to only 48%.
1 0 Table 3 .10 reports the currency and term structure by sector of economic activity. The common factor to all of them is the high dollarization of liabilities, lower dollarization of assets, extremely high share of short-term liabilities, and lower share of short-term assets. Thus, currency and term mismatches are a phenomenon common to all sectors of activity.
Uruguay's dollarization experience, as in the case of many other countries in Latin America and beyond, is the legacy of several decades of high and unstable rates of inflation, which eroded trust in the national currency as a store of value, medium of exchange and even a unit of account. In the absence of widespread indexation to inflation, economic agents became unwilling to enter into any medium-term contracts unless the payment amounts specified were protected from currency depreciation, and indirectly from the ravages of inflation, by being indexed to or expressed in USD. As a result, firms increasingly realized that any obligations to banks or suppliers not subject to correction for inflation or currency depreciation necessarily would be of a very short-term nature. Practically the only way to obtain longer-term funds -other than through the issuance of equity stakes, of course -way to do so via contracts in USD, exposing oneself to a currency mismatch. This is why between 90% and 100% of all corporate bonds issued during 1994-2004 were denominated in USD. Indeed, the currency and maturity composition of any obligation contemplated by borrowers or lenders came to be determined jointly as part of the same portfolio decision. There is some evidence of a systematic relationship between the two key dimensions of a firm's financial structure: the maturity structure of its total liabilities, measured as the fraction of long-term debt in total debt, and its 2 2 degree of liability dollarization, measured as the percentage of total liabilities which are denominated in, or indexed to, USD. Here we have plotted said relationship using yearly observations from 1994 to 2001, where each observation in the plot corresponds to a given maturity/dollarization combination of a firm's indebtedness in a particular year. To control for common factors driving both the duration and currency profile, we used the orthogonal components of dollarization and maturity to a set of common regressors, including firm size, maturity of assets, the tradable nature of output, the importance of exports, and the extent of leverage and foreign ownership.
The scatter diagram suggests the presence of a strong firm-level correlation between the maturity of corporate debt and its dollarization, in this case with a correlation coefficient of 0.35 with a t-statistic of 9.5.
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According to the AIN database, for 2001 the simple correlation coefficient is of 0.34 and decreases to 0.12 for 2003. This empirical evidence suggests that the observed dollarization of liabilities may well be motivated by a desire to extend the maturity structure of obligations -and not necessarily by a given currency preference.
We have also considered the relationship between maturity and dollarization of liabilities across seven Latin American countries. Figure 3 .2 plots the crosscountry relationship between average maturity and average dollarization of debt in each year during 1994-2002. Each point in the chart represents a country/year observation, obtained by averaging the firm-specific maturity and dollarization ratios in the cross-section in a given year. The figure provides As can be seen, Uruguay displays the highest ratio of average liability dollarization and the shortest average maturity among all Latin American countries. Indeed, when compared to the other countries covered in the sample, Uruguay features (a) the highest level of financial dollarization in the corporate sector; (b) the highest within-country correlation between firm-specific dollarization ratios and debt maturity profiles; and (c) the shortest countryaveraged debt maturities. These three stylized facts may well be the manifestation of a broader underlying characteristic of an incomplete financial market -namely, that the market for long-term funds denominated in the local currency (pesos) is missing.
2.b. The effect of an unanticipated devaluation
This section provides an analysis of corporate vulnerability to exchange rate fluctuations as of the end of 2004, two years after Uruguay switched to a flexible exchange rate regime and prudential regulations were overhauled. A key output of the work is to quantify the potential for financial stress arising from unhedged currency mismatches in firms' balance sheets--liabilities in foreign currency that are not fully backed by assets or income streams also in foreign currency. In conducting the stress-test analysis, the main focus was in exploring the impact on non-financial firms' solvency or liquidity of sudden exchange-rate changes.
Results can also shed light on the sensitivity of the underlying credit quality (and associated losses) of bank loans to exchange rate shocks. Indeed, by lending 2 4
USD to domestic firms and consumers (most of them non-USD earners), many banks may well have traded exchange rate risk for default risk, shifting their currency mismatch from their own balance sheets to those of firms (and consumers). This is especially relevant in the case of Uruguay, where loans to the corporate sector account for a significant portion of total lending and are mostly denominated in USD.
The results of the previous subsection show that Uruguayan firms still face the potential for financial stress arising from sizable and unhedged balance sheet currency mismatches -liabilities in foreign currency that are not fully backed by assets or income streams also in foreign currency. Although these mismatches may not be a concern in the current external environment of low interest rates and an appreciating domestic currency, they may become a source of financial instability once external conditions become less benign.
In conducting the sensitivity analysis, the main focus was to explore the linkages between exchange rate developments and the corporate sector, by examining the impact on non-financial firms' solvency or liquidity of exchange rate risk. To assess a firm's financial health, we used two criteria: a) the debtservice coverage ratio (the fraction of financial liabilities coming due in less than a year covered by cash flow) and b) the net worth position of the firm (total assets minus total liabilities).
For the purpose of the stress test, we defined a firm to be financially stressed whenever an exchange-rate depreciation made it unable to meet short-term obligations 1 2 (liquidity effect) and/or pushed the firm to a negative equity position (balance sheet effect). We thus assessed the effect that different exchange rate shocks have on interest coverage ratios and the proportion of firms that are at greater risk of defaulting. To assess the downside exchange rate risk of the corporate sector, we stress-tested the portfolio of each firm to a 5%, 10%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100% nominal devaluation.
Estimates on the contractionary effects of a sudden devaluation are conservative (i.e., they provide a lower bound) for four reasons. First, we only considered a sudden depreciation of the domestic currency, excluding other simultaneous effects like an increase in interest rates which typically accompanies said depreciation. Second, to assess the vulnerability to foreign currency borrowing, we only considered financial debt, implicitly assuming that USD trade-credit liabilities could be rolled over through negotiations with suppliers in the event of financial distress. Third, the exercise was static in nature in that we only considered the direct or "first round" effect on each firm, excluding spillover or dynamic effects -for example, a breakdown in the chain of payments among firms. Finally, we only considered firms that as 2004 had an initially healthy financial position, to avoid the results being contaminated by firms near bankruptcy.
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The results of the stress test show whether different scenarios featuring a significant depreciation of the peso would have a large effect on corporate capital and ability to service bank debt. For every possible static scenario, the number expressed in percentage terms represents the fraction accounted by the group of distressed firms in the total value of each variable for the whole sample.
The results presented in Table 3 .11 indicate that Uruguayan firms remain vulnerable to a sudden peso depreciation, given high levels of unhedged, shortterm foreign currency borrowing -liabilities in foreign currency that are not fully backed by assets or income streams also in foreign currency. Furthermore, 93% of the firms without a complete, natural hedge do not buy financial hedges in the market. In this sense, there is no evidence that the corporate sector was more resilient to foreign exchange rate risk than before the 2002 crisis.
The high share of financial liabilities accounted by the pool of firms in distress suggests a significant vulnerability of the banking system to corporate credit risk. For prudential reasons, bank balance sheets are protected from the direct impact of a devaluation, as their net assets in foreign currency adequately reflect the dollarization of their balance sheet. Commercial banks, however, are exposed to devaluation-induced credit risks from loans granted to non-USD earners or firms with significant currency mismatches . Thus, the high proportion of unhedged foreign currency borrowing can render Uruguayan firms -and by extension, their bank creditors -highly vulnerable to a sharp increase in the exchange rate . Systemic effects of a sudden devaluation can extend well beyond the banking sector, working through other channels like the breakdown of the inter-firm chain of payments. While these cross-linkages within the real sector are not typically the focus of vulnerability analysis, the potential for cascading inter-firm exposure is in principle relevant given the importance of supplier's credit in the total liabilities of corporations. 
Survey of potential issuers: the INE database 2.
The construction of the survey was considered carefully. A common problem with this type of one-off surveys is that respondents are usually more careful in their evaluation of the first set of unfamiliar questions, and then they tend to give shorter shrift to answering the latter ones. In order to avoid the effect of the list order in the evaluation procedure, we generated two types of questionnaires, A and B. The first item in Questionnaire A became the last one in Questionnaire B; the second item in Questionnaire A became the next-to-last one in Questionnaire B; and so on and so forth. Questionnaires A and B were assigned randomly to firms. The analysis of this section was carried out for both types of questionnaires and the results were rather similar. Therefore, we only present the aggregates.
a. Role of knowledge
One of the hypotheses that we wanted to check was whether potential issuers lack knowledge about the requirements of issuance, and the feasibility of issuing, corporate debt. We included a specific question allowing respondents to classify themselves as knowing enough, something or nothing about the use of bonds and ABS as financial sourcing alternatives. Although this survey was targeted to the CFOs (or equivalent) of the firms, only about one quarter of respondents reported to have a good knowledge of bonds and ABS.
7
Another aspect is the decision process of many firms that, though organized as corporations, tends to follow the traditional family-business structure. This conservative structure -and despite what will be presented in the following paragraphs -may preclude managers from considering financing alternatives that could release information about the firm into the public domain. In this connection, it is worthy of note the extent of reluctance of surveyed firms to use non-traditional financial instruments: Only 13 firms (7%) in the whole sample reported that they use derivative instruments to manage or change the profile of their liabilities. Table 3 .12 suggests that lack of knowledge is pervasive despite the branch of economic activity and the origin of firm ownership. The lack of knowledge relates to both bonds and ABS, and the availability of information of these two alternatives is highly correlated. To illustrate, we constructed indexes of knowledge taking the values of 1 if the firms say they know nothing, 2 if they know something, and 3 if they know "enough" about bonds and ABS. The correlation between both indexes of knowledge turned out to be 0.79. Of those firms that used to issue bonds in the past and no longer do so anymore, 12 firms reported specific reasons why they stopped. There is no one reason that clearly predominates over others: High costs of issuance were reported 3 times; high interest rates were mentioned 2 times; low investor demand was reported 4 times; other issuance requirements were mentioned 2 times; and bad reputation of the firm was admitted 2 times.
2.c. Problems with bank financing
Uruguayan firms have two main sources of external funds: bank loans and suppliers' credit. Naturally, most the bank financing is provided by financial institutions located in-country: About 300 firms report that they obtain credit form local banks, and only 20 firms report having access to credit from banks abroad. This also affected the rates of response to the questions relating to problems with the availability of bank financing. More than 90% of the sample was able to evaluate weather collateral requirements, bank monitoring, slow approval processes, high interest rates in pesos, or access to credit only in USD were aspects relating to accessing bank credit from institutions operating in Uruguay. On the other hand, only 40% of firms were able to evaluate these factors with respect to banks located outside Uruguay. Table 3 .14 reports the percentage of those respondents that considered each of these issues to be a problem. In spite of the already-mentioned currency mismatches of Uruguayan firms, availability of credit only in USD is not considered a problem per se. According to the results of this survey, the problem is not the availability of peso-denominated loans, but rather their relatively high cost. Another important problem is the requirement for firms to put up collateral, and to a lesser extent the speed of approval and disbursement of loans.
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It should be noted that 45% of respondents have the perception that local banks are not willing to lend. This contradicts the view of banks according to our survey of market-makers is Section 4, where they stress their willingness to lend but the high risks involved in financing local firms.
With respect to banks outside Uruguay, each of the evaluated factors seems to be less of a problem. However, this result should be treated with caution since this better evaluation of conditions prevailing when accessing credit extended by banks abroad may be the result of a self-selection process by the firms that were surveyed.
2.d. Problems with bond financing
Similarly to the comparison of obstacles encountered with banks in Uruguay and banks outside Uruguay, the survey found that replies on the factors affecting issuance of bonds outside Uruguay was much lower than replies on the issuance of corporate debt in Uruguay. Moreover, the response rate for bonds financing was smaller than the response rate for bank financing, betraying less familiarity with the subject. Overall, half of the surveyed firms evaluated the factors affecting the issuance of bonds in Uruguay and only 26% the issuance of bonds abroad. Table 3 .15 reports the percentage of respondents than perceived each evaluated factor to be a problem with financing via bonds. There are notable similarities in most factors for bonds issued in Uruguay and abroad; the only significant difference is with respect to market size -perceived to be small in Uruguay but not abroad. Moreover, this is the factor most mentioned as a problem in terms of issuing bonds domestically. This lack of perceived investor demand again stands in contradiction with the results of the institutional investors' survey of Section 4. There, institutional investors reported their willingness to invest in corporate debt, but expressed the view that there were no worthwhile projects to be underwritten. This contradiction may in part be solved by the fact that the second most-reported problem is the non-existence of a market for low-rated, speculative bonds. The fees charged by credit-rating agencies are also considered by more than half of respondents to be a problem.
Most of the firms do not consider the other factors as important impediments to issue bonds. In particular, this is true with respect to underwriters' fees, minimum issue requirements, and disclosure requirements. In our questionnaire, we added an extra question to evaluate the willingness of firms to disclose information. The question was: "Are you willing to disclose the necessary information in order to be rated by a credit agency as a preliminary step to an eventual issuance of bonds?" One third of total respondents were positive about their willingness to disclose information; 31% said they were probably willing to do so; and only 36% of respondents had a negative inclination towards information disclosure (answering "No, probably" and "No, for sure"). Table 3 .16 reports how the more the firms know about bond market, the more inclined they are to disclose information. 
2.e. Obstacles to obtaining financing in Uruguay
In evaluating the problems to obtain financing in Uruguay trough the banking system or through the issuance of corporate debt, we again had very different response rates. More than 90% of respondents were able to evaluate the access to bank credit, while only 46% were able to make a judgment about bond financing.
In comparative terms, banks were viewed better with respect to speed of access to the required financing and in terms of the information requirements involved. Also, the relatively high minimum required amount to make a bond issuance worthwhile was considered a disadvantage. Bonds were viewed more favorably in terms of the possibility of accessing longer-term funds and with respect to requirements for a guarantee. Despite this, guarantee requirements were considered an important obstacle in both alternatives. The most frequent 1 complaint was the cost of borrowed capital, and the least one -consistent with the previous subsection -was the information requirements. The results in Table 3 .17 suggest that list-order effects are not important.
2.f. Criteria to choose financing sources
We asked firms to consider five financing alternatives: banks in Uruguay or abroad, issuance of bonds in Uruguay or abroad, and suppliers' credit from whichever source. Here we controlled for order effects in the way financial alternatives were presented. Since the results were also qualitatively similar, we only present the aggregate results, shown in Table 3 .18.
Suppliers' credit is perceived as by far the best alternative in almost all dimensions. Long-term lending and the size of loans with respect to the firm's financing needs are the only two aspects in which suppliers' credit does not clearly dominate the other financial alternatives. With respect to long-term lending, the preferred option is credit from a Uruguayan bank. It is surprising that in our sample only 34% of bank credit is long-term by nature. Many firms have ongoing relations with banks and are constantly renewing short-term credits. Therefore, although these credits are formally of a short-term nature, they may be perceived as a long-term financing alternative on the assumption that they can be rolled over. Naturally, the risk exposure of firms to sudden credit crunches is enormous. 
Costs of issuance in the Uruguayan marketplace
We applied the methodology of Zervos (2004) , to address the costs of issuing debt in the Uruguayan corporate bond market. These costs only apply to the private sector, since the government issues debt in the domestic market at no cost.
Among the main costs detected are the intervening bank fees, being the most important the underwriting fees.
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The range is wide, depending on the complexity of the issue and the characteristics of the issuer. They usually vary between 0.5% and 1.5% of the issue amount, applying the lower bound to "plain-vanilla" corporate bonds issued by well-established firms, and the upper to more sophisticated financial structures, like ABS.
The arrangement costs of the issue can be charged to the issuer by the intervening bank or any other financial advisor. According with the interviews made, they are usually close to 0.75%, while distribution costs have a range of 0.75-1.50%. Another important cost related to the issue comes from legal fees, associated with the preparation of a legal document, usually accompanied by a prospectus and an offering memorandum. These costs are the more difficult to estimate, but according to information provided by local issuers they have a range of US$5,000-10,000.
In the case of Uruguay no regulatory fees apply. The two bourses, Bolsa de Valores de Montevideo and Bolsa Electrónica de Valores, apply registration fees that vary from 0.04% to 0.10%, depending on the size of the issue. The higher fee apply for issues less than US$1.5 million, while the lower is charged to issues higher than US$20 million. Finally, the Uruguayan regulatory agency requires at least one credit rating for all issuers. The fees charged by credit rating agencies usually vary from US$10,000 to US$15.000.
There are other costs that are charged during the life of the bond. For instance, a fiduciary agent, when needed, usually applies annual fees of 0.15-0.25%. The two bourses charge, besides the initial registration cost, an annual maintenance fee of 0.005-0.020%. The credit rating agencies also apply annual fees, usually around 10% of the initial fee. We only consider in this paper the initial costs. We do not consider other costs, such as for auditing financial statements, given that those costs are of a more general nature, especially considering that the firms that issue securities are required to present audited financial statements.
The results are presented in Table 3 .19. Given the fixed nature of many of the issuance costs, we examine the impact of the costs for a wide range of face value issued, as in Zervos (2004) . As expected, issuance costs are more significant in relation with the size of the issue for the smaller ones. For issues Zervos (2004) , but are much higher than in Mexico (see Table 3 .20). The problems arise when the costs are adjusted for maturity. Until recently, the maturity of Uruguayan corporate bonds was very short, and thus the impact of issuance costs was quite significant in the overall decision. For instance, a 3% issuance cost is equivalent to an increase of 76 bps in the interest rate for a 4-year bond, while it only adds 30 bps to the cost of a 10-year bond. 
Demand analysis: Institutional investors
The agents and their portfolios
The principal institutional investors in Uruguay's capital market are the pension funds, created after the reform of the social security system in 1996. There are four companies managing pension funds: The state-owned República AFAP plus the three asset managers owned by private-sector banks operating in Uruguay, which are Afinidad AFAP, Integración AFAP and Unión Capital AFAP.
The importance of the pension funds comes not only from the size of the funds under management -the equivalent of more than US$2 billion as of endOctober 2005 -but also from their highly qualified staff, operating in a very competitive environment. For both reasons, the investment decisions of the pension funds are a clear sign of the quality of the securities under consideration.
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The investments of the pension funds are highly regulated in terms of types of securities, currency denomination and jurisdiction. The law establishes most of the limits, but there are some others introduced by the relevant regulatory agency, the BCU. Some relevant restrictions to the allocation of resources in the portfolios of the pension funds are:
• Exposure to jurisdictions: The pension funds are not allowed to make any investments outside Uruguay.
• Exposure to currencies: Investments in foreign currencies cannot exceed 60% of the value of the portfolio.
• Exposure to the government: Investment in securities issued by the Central Government cannot exceed the 60% of pension fund assets ; securities issued by the state-owned mortgage bank (Banco Hipotecario del Uruguay, BHU) and the BCU itself may not exceed 30% of pension fund assets.
• Exposure to banks: Time deposits in financial institutions must be represented by certificates of deposits and cannot exceed 30% of assets.
• Exposure to firms: Securities issued by private-sector corporations are constrained by a 25% limit; in addition, the BCU does not allow securities issued by any particular company to amount to more than 3% of total assets, or to constitute more than 50% of the amount outstanding of each security. This applies to both corporate bonds and stocks.
• Exposure to asset-backed securities: These instruments may not amount to more than 20% of pension fund assets, and are likewise constrained by the 3% ceiling on any given issuer. This applies to both so-called Certificates Representative of Investments (CRIs) and to Financial Trusts (fideicomisos financieros).
• Exposure to beneficiaries of the pension system: This exposure is limited to 15% of pension assets.
• Aggregate exposure to securities of the non-financial private sector: The last three exposures mentioned cannot exceed, altogether, 40% of total pension assets.
At present, pension fund holdings of sovereign debt are close to the current ceiling imposed by law: At the end of October 2005, 59% of the value of the portfolio of the pension funds was allocated to securities issued by the Uruguayan central government ( The pension funds are also heavily invested in securities issued by the monetary authority: 23.7% in the aggregate, with a concentration in newly issued inflation-linked securities, which represent 21.9% of the total portfolio. The sum of holdings of securities issued by the BCU and the BHU (24.7% of total assets) are nonetheless below the maximum of 30% established by law.
Pension fund exposures to non-financial, private-sector instruments are well below the limits: All the corporate bonds, stocks, CRIs and financial trusts held represented a mere 2.9% of total assets at the end of October 2005. Interestingly, the aggregate cash position of the four pension funds at the end of October (4.9% of assets) was almost as large as their holdings of private sector securities issued by non-financial enterprises. Given their relatively young age, most of their liabilities are long term in nature. In general, the pension funds have been reducing their cash positions since the crisis of 2002, when they reached a peak of 18.8% in July of that year. During the twelve months ending this past October, cash holdings were cut from 9.2% to 4.9% of total portfolios, and the main use of those funds was the purchase of bank-issued CDs, which increased their participation in portfolios from 3.9% in October 2004 to 7.6% by October 2005.
The pension funds had contributed greatly to the development of a market for peso-denominated instruments, at least through their participation in the primary market for debt. Prior to the financial crisis of 2002, the holdings of pesodenominated instruments represented around one-fourth of the total portfolio of the pension funds. The crisis induced a run from domestic currency, and instruments in pesos decreased to less than 5% of the value of pension assets by mid-2002. The country's economic and financial stabilization has since supported a rebound in demand for peso instruments, and by the end of October 2005 their share in pension funds had jumped to 55.7% of total, mostly in the form of inflation-linked securities (45.2% of portfolios, see Table 2 .6) 
Survey of institutional investors and intermediaries
With the cooperation of BEVSA, we carried out a survey among pension fund managers and leading financial intermediaries. The four main existing pension funds and 12 out of 14 targeted banks answered our survey.
2.a. Pension funds
As the figures of the composition of the pension funds suggest, the legal constraints imposed on their capacity to invest in private sector, non-financial issuers are not binding. Not only is the allocation of resources to these instruments well below the extreme bounds allowed by legislation, but recent history shows that new funds arising from contributions to the pension system and the reduction of cash holdings have been invested in other investmentsbasically, CDs issued by banking institutions. According to the survey made among the pension funds, managers feel that the regulations imposed by law and the regulatory agency (the BCU) are especially binding with respect to their ability to invest abroad. Indeed, when pension fund managers are asked about the allocation of their assets if they did not face any regulatory constraints, they consistently point to a desired increase in the share of external assets in their portfolios. In one case, the managers noted the 3 7 restriction affecting the possibility to invest in CDs issued by banks -not because of the ceiling on the overall portfolio of the pension fund, but because of limitations posed by the net worth of the issuer. As can be expected from the behavior revealed in the composition of the portfolios, no binding legal restrictions are emphasized on the side of their ability to invest in the securities of private sector, non-financial firms.
The survey reveals a perception of high risk entailed in investments in corporate bonds. Among the factors affecting the decision to invest in said instruments, the answer to the criterion "high risk of insolvency" was "Yes" in all the answers obtained. In three of the four cases, the criterion "limited legal recourse in the event of default" was considered a relevant factor. This perception may be based on the recent history of defaults involving issuers of corporate bonds.
The availability of information does not seem to be a limiting factor in the demand for corporate bonds. Only one of the four managers answered "Yes" to the criterion "lack of timely information about the issuer," suggesting that default risks are viewed as related more to sudden changes in the macroeconomic environment rather than to lack of appropriate information on the issuer. In the same vein, only one manager considered the credit rating system to be of "low quality" or too costly -the same single manager that pointed to inadequate information about issuers. In sum, according to the majority of the managers of the pension funds, problems with the potential demand for corporate bonds do not arise from an inadequate information system to assess the risk involved, but from a perception of high macroeconomic risks stemming from the high vulnerability of Uruguayan companies to economic shocks and difficulties to enforce creditor rights in the event of a default.
All the managers of pension funds surveyed considered "low market capitalization" as a limiting factor, but the absence of a deep secondary market does not seem to be relevant for the decision to invest in corporate bonds. In three of the four cases, the answer to "low liquidity/poor functioning of the secondary market" was "No", revealing that, in general, the pension funds act as hold-to-maturity investors.
When the managers are asked about the allocation of additional funds in their portfolio, the answers point to the need for a greater diversification. They would like to reduce the share of government securities in their portfolio (except in one case) and to increase the participation of domestic private-sector securities and foreign assets. Asked about the apparent contradiction of being ready to increase investments in "domestic corporate bonds" in a context where they can do this already, managers say that any marginal availability of funds would likely be directed to CDs issued by banks. In one case, the additional funds would be allocated to cash, given the perceived lack of investment opportunities.
The evidence on the perception of either a "crowding-out" effect or a positive externality effect between government and corporate bonds is mixed. The reaction to the statement "A large stock of government bonds is important for the development of the corporate bond market" is tilted to "disagreement" 3 8
(except in one case), suggesting that, from the point of view of the pension funds, the underdevelopment of the capital market is not a constraint to allocate resources to private-sector projects. At the same time, the statement "Government and corporate bonds are substitutes in your portfolio" had a reaction also tilted to disagreement (except in the same case as before).
The apparent contradiction with the expectation that government debt serves as a useful benchmark to develop the capital market, facilitating issuance by private-sector firms once transactions costs are reduced, can be explained by the special characteristics of the pension funds as institutional investors. As was pointed out earlier, the pension funds in Uruguay seem to behave as hold-tomaturity investors, and so they are mostly worried with an adequate assumption of risk through an appropriate design of the financial instrument and with access to the primary market -rather than with the extent of liquidity in the secondary market or the eventual impact of public debt on returns on private-sector securities. This explanation is consistent with the good reception that some structured (asset-backed) credits issued recently had among pension funds -in fact, in some instances these instruments were placed solely among pension funds. The common factor that those successful placements had was appropriate contract design aimed at facilitating the recovery of the investment in case of default.
2.b. Other institutional investors
Besides the pension funds, there are other institutional investors involved in the management of sector-specific pension systems, like those funds serving selfemployed professionals and bank employees. Given that those other pension systems also have some participation in the Uruguayan capital market, we extended the survey to cover these secondary pension funds, as well.
Like in the case of the pension funds already considered, government securities represent the greater portion of the portfolios managed by these institutional investors. They share with the managers of the main pension funds their worries about "high insolvency risk" on the part of corporate bond issuers, but they are more consistently concerned with problems of appropriate information about the issuer -including the role of credit-rating agencies and the reliability of their judgments -and with the extent of liquidity in the secondary market. It must be taken into account that, in contrast to the relatively new managers of pension funds in the wake of the reform of the social security system of 1995, the pension funds for self-employed professionals and bank employees are totally mature, and the composition of their portfolios thus look for returns but also for high liquidity.
Consistent with this view, all the surveyed investors attribute importance, as limiting factors affecting their decision to invest in corporate bonds, to problems such as "low market capitalization" and "low liquidity/functioning of the secondary market". As in the case of the managers of the main pension funds, there is no clear consensus about the role of government debt in the 3 9 development of the capital market. The statement "A large stock of government bonds is important for the development of the corporate bond market" receives a variety of reactions, while the statement "Government and corporate bonds are substitutes in your portfolio" receives answers tilted toward "disagreement". Since government securities are so prominent in pension fund portfolios, these answers can be interpreted as expressing an interest in private-sector securities as a means to increase average returns on portfolios.
2.c. Financial intermediaries
Given the absence of a great variety of institutional investors and the important presence of retail investors in the Uruguayan capital market, we considered useful to extend the survey to include some important market-makers like banks and stock brokers, whose opinions are also influential in the investment decision of their customers.
There are no significant differences in the points of view of the market makers with those already referred coming from institutional investors. Among the banks that gave information on the composition of their portfolios (nine of twelve reported their own and third-party positions), only two (of nine) reported a significant (around 10%) share of corporate bonds. In the rest, the share was almost zero. There are in fact many coincidences in terms of risk-return considerations about the limitations to investing in corporate bonds. The perception is that returns are often too low given the default risks involved, or that default risks are unacceptably high given the returns available. Like in the case of other institutional investors, there are more concerns about liquidity in the secondary market than in the case of the main pension funds. It is complemented by a generalized view that "low market capitalization" is a determinant factor discouraging the investment in corporate debt.
However, as a difference with other financial intermediaries, there is a great deal of dispersion in reactions to the eventual lack of good quality in the services provided by credit-rating agencies, but most of the firms surveyed agree that the "lack of timely information about the issuer" is a relevant factor that militates against investments in private-sector corporate bonds.
The revealed interest in corporate debt showed to be particularly negative when financial intermediaries were asked about the allocation of increased resources. Only one of twelve showed a consistent interest in augment the share of corporate debt under this scenario. Notwithstanding that, the interest in "corporate debt indexed to inflation if it became widely available" had a more mixed response, possibly reflecting the fact that main factors that discourage investment in corporate bonds are "low secondary market liquidity" and "low market capitalization" (and that is the reason why the note "widely available" can make a difference).
4 0
Conclusions
The Uruguayan capital markets in general and the fixed income market in particular have functioned well in terms of allowing for secondary market transactions of government debt, but are extremely undeveloped in terms of private-sector securities. After a short period of relative boom in the mid-1990s, the market for corporate debt declined and has remained underdeveloped. The financial fragility of Uruguayan firms (so clearly obvious in the 2002 crisis) amplified by corporate governance problems are the main reasons for such underdevelopment.
From an investor point of view, the perception of high corporate fragility makes them eager to invest in public debt, other financial instruments locally or abroad, or even to make direct investments in sectors where by their specific knowledge they can quantify industry-specific risks and corporate governance problems.
The existence of financial intermediaries with the ability to closely monitor the performance of the firms in their portfolios could alleviate the high risk associated with local corporations. In the past, several investment funds were active in the market but unfortunately they also disappeared due to a combination of the economic crisis and internal (fund) corporate governance problems that affected their reputation. Today the main institutional investors are the pension funds. There are other institutional investors of lesser importance, like insurance companies (the main one is state-owned) and other ones involved in the management of sector-specific pension systems. The emergence of new institutional investors (e.g. investment funds) is unlikely. Based on the good reputation of the pension funds, it may be advisable to allow them to manage more than one fund (e.g., complementary retirement benefits) and capture more investments that can at least in part be targeted to the corporate sector. Currently, the law does not allow them to do this.
The roots for the corporate sector fragility can be found in an unstable macroeconomic environment and the widespread nature of currency mismatches. The macroeconomic instability of the last decades is responsible for the high dollarization of the Uruguayan economy and the absence of financial instruments denominated in local currency. The government is now pursuing a de-dollarization agenda, and institutional investors -the leading pension funds -have played an important role in the development of a market for peso-denominated (mostly inflation-adjusted) instruments. But households and firms are somewhat more reluctant to change long-term practices in personal portfolio management, so it is not clear that currency mismatches will soon be reduced. Thus, firms are likely to keep running currency mismatches while the banking system keeps running currency-related credit risks.
Uruguay has been the most dollarized country in Latin America and yet also the country where corporate debt has had the shortest average maturity. This situation has generated currency and maturity mismatches that have exposed the country's firms to dangerous currency and refinancing risks. The 4 1 development of a deeper fixed-income market would surely ameliorate these structural financial problems faced by Uruguayan firms.
Although there may be some regulatory deficiencies, the main determinants of this condition of limited access are not of a regulatory nature. The major perceived shortcomings by institutional investors are not inadequate information to assess the risks involved, but rather the vulnerability of Uruguayan firms to macroeconomic shocks and difficulties to enforce creditor rights in the event of default.
Moreover, potential issuers declare their willingness to disclosure the requested information in order to be rated as a first step to eventual debt issuance. Beyond this declared willingness, there is surprisingly little knowledge among corporate managers about financial alternatives to borrowing from banks and suppliers.
Despite the fact that transparency is not perceived as a problem by investors and the apparent readiness of many firms to disclose information, the usual agency problems associated with long-term debt have promoted opportunistic behavior by firm owners and managers that in the end have resulted in default episodes. These episodes generated important negative externalities that affected and still linger in the domestic capital market.
A deepening of the fixed-income market could help to extend corporate debt maturities, helping to reduce these kinds of mismatches and thereby fostering investment in fixed assets and economic growth. Moreover, reduced dependence on short-term bank credit would also lower the exposure of firms to interest-rate and credit-availability cycles.
Currently, the only actively traded issues in the market are those issued by the public sector. There are very few private-sector firms that look attractive for the capital markets. We expect that those few firms that until now have managed to maintain their reputation and have been successful in the past in securing funds from the capital market will continue to do have access. Eventually, we could observe some new firms from expanding sectors getting into the fixed-income market. The appearance of ABS transactions may allow investors to get around the financial fragility problem and especially the corporate governance problem, but again the size of the firms makes it difficult to find assets or claims on future income large enough to make issuance worthwhile. Thus, most firms will likely keep funding their activities through the banking sector and through supplier's credit.
Existing large state-owned firms could fund their investments through the capital market. The problem is that they are restricted because their debt is included in and managed as public sector debt, and their investment plans are part of discretional government spending. Nevertheless, other public sector-related projects like private sector issuance to finance public infrastructure projects may come to pass.
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The overwhelming size of the government's indebtedness does not seem to be generating sizeable crowding-out effects. Our survey showed that firms were pretty neutral with respect to the effect of government debt. Given the early financial liberalization of the Uruguayan economy, capital movements are such that in the absence of Uruguayan public debt, those agents currently holding these assets could have obtained similar ones in the international markets. Government debt may set a benchmark for private sector debt pricing, but according to our survey, firms do not really appreciate this externality and in any case it is something of a second-order of magnitude given the other more severe problems encountered. In the meantime, the issuance and trading of government debt certainly allows the two Uruguayan bourses to survive. 
